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1. INTRODUCTION
Visser’s “A formal account of complex argumentation in a critical discussion” offers
a valuable first step towards a much-awaited endeavour, namely, the development
of a computational interpretation of Pragma-dialectics. It is difficult to exaggerate
the importance of this project: Pragma-dialectics is one of the most powerful
theories within Argumentation Studies and the possibility of dealing with the model
of critical discussion in computational terms opens the possibility of important
developments in computer-based learning tools, in decision support systems and, in
general, in all those fields in which the meeting between computer science and
argumentation theory is already being fruitful. As Visser himself points out, it is
surprising that this project has been hanging for almost three decades! (To be true,
in principle, such a project will have to wait a bit longer, as it constitutes Visser’s
ongoing doctoral dissertation. What we have here is only one part of it, and a
valuable glance of his overall proposal.)
Visser’s approach is dialogue games, which is not meant to be original:
actually, the idea of modelling dialogue exchanges as computational games in this
way goes back to, at least, Prakken’s formal systems for persuasion dialogues
(2001). But as Visser explains, Pragma-dialectics is particularly valuable to this end
because of its concern with speech-act theory: in principle, the standards for
analyzing actual dialogues are closer to their interpretation than in any other
approach. This is a great advantage in its own, as it enables a more direct
formalization of actual communicative processes; but, in addition, it may make
easier the development of communication protocols for artificial agents. Moreover,
as it is well known, Pragma-dialectics’ concern with the pragmatic intricacies of
actual argumentative exchanges has been enriched in the last times with a rhetorical
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perspective that, as Visser envisages, might be integrated within a computational
model in terms of a game theoretic layer of persuasive strategy. A final gain of this
project, Visser points out, is to enable an integration of a ‘product’ and ‘process’
perspective on computational models of argumentation, because Pragma-dialectics
integrates a ‘product’ account of argumentation in terms of the argumentation
structure that underlies an argumentative exchange with a ‘process’ account of
argumentation in terms of the rules that apply in such exchanges. As Visser
contends, such integration could bring us closer to realistic computational models of
human argumentative practice that, at the same time, enable practicable software
applications.
All this would show that Visser’s project should have a very positive impact
within the flourishing field of Argumentation and Computation. In turn, Pragmadialectics, and Argumentation Theory in general, could benefit from this project in
as much as the recursive treatment of any theory might reveal some of its
weaknesses and needs of improvement. It is this latter question that we would like
to consider at some length in these comments.
2. VISSER’S FORMAL ACCOUNT OF PRAGMA-DIALECTICS’ ARGUMENTATION STAGE
Visser’s target in this paper is only one stage of the critical discussion, namely, the
argumentation stage. His strategy is to characterize a dialogue game according to
the pragma-dialectical rules that apply to the argumentation stage. His goal is to
show “how sequences of moves in the dialogue game relate to complex
argumentation structures” (Visser, 2013, p. 1).
To this end, he proposes a directed-graph consisting of all those moves that
the two players of a game are allowed or required to make at this stage if they are to
count as having a critical discussion, which is what determines the adequacy of their
exchange.
Now, let us focus in Visser’s reconstruction of a single argumentation case, as
this is the pattern that all complex argumentation structures are supposed to consist
of. Single argumentation is the case in which the proponent puts forward an
argument (understood as a simple, first order constative speech-act) in defence of a
standpoint. Visser points out that, in his graph, this occurs when, during a game, the
protagonist's move “Arg A, A justifies Stp S” is made exactly once because either the
antagonist accepted the argument outright, or did so as a result of successfully going
through intersubjective procedures. Pragma-dialectics considers four types of
intersubjective procedures -namely, identification, inference, explicitization or
testing (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004)- but in this part of his project, Visser
only takes into account identification and testing.
At any rate, it should be noted that the development of intersubjective
procedures is supposed to proceed through further argumentation. For this reason,
the way in which single argumentation can be seen as constituting the basis that
recursively gives rise to any other type of complex argumentation structures is just
(in Visser’s account):
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1
1.1
1.1'

S
A
A justifies S

But what does it mean to put forward 1.1’ as a premise? What does it mean to
say that A justifies S? In principle, justification is the output of good argumentation,
so that the premise that A justifies S amounts to the premise that there is good
argumentation from A to S. But in that case, are we not saying that single
argumentation -that is, the basic argumentative unit within a critical discussionmakes an inextricable appeal to its own goodness? Moreover, following Pragmadialectics’ own standards, this means that, in order to have a winner strategy for a
single argumentation, such a self-referential premise has to be in the list of shared
premises. But in that case, why should we engage in a critical discussion for
justifying S?
Notice that this problem does not appear just because of the way Visser has
reconstructed single argumentation in his model: if, instead of 1.1’, he had
introduced something like
(1.1’’) “if A, then S”,
he would still have to show how the new set of shared premises plus standpoint
could constitute single sound argumentation at all -for example, it might be the case
that the corresponding inference is defeasible, so that having 1.1 and 1.1’’ as shared
premises does not constitute a sound defence of S.
If this observation is correct, the critical discussion model cannot constitute a
model of justification, but a model of something else -like, for example, the way to
dialectically proceed once we have a sub-theory of justification. If we deem
justification as the output of good argumentation, as we think we should, this means
that Pragma-dialectics, by itself, is not a normative theory of argumentation.
3. CONCLUSION
Paradoxically, this attempt to present Pragma-dialectics as a computational
normative model of argumentation would end up showing that Pragma-dialectics is
not such a model. Certainly, it might be discussed whether Visser’s use of the
Argument Interchange Format for the analytic overview is adequate for the
requirements of Pragma-dialectics, including its account of speech-acts. As Visser
himself acknowledges:
While the original ideal model of a critical discussion is pragmatic besides
dialectical, I currently only take an abstracted view of a discussion progressing like a
game without going into the details of how these discussion moves are manifested
in terms of illocutionary acts. (Visser, 2013, p. 5)

But, as we have tried to show, this is not a problem of the way in which Visser
has modelled the critical discussion procedure, but of the way in which Pragma-
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dialectics makes an inextricable appeal to justification both as part of the critical
discussion procedure and as the alleged output of playing by the rules.
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